Dequech, David. Fundamental uncertainty and ambiguity Eastern Economic Journal, Winter 2000, 26(1): 40-60. Language: English. Pub type: Features; Studies; Experimental [Abstract][Long Display] ABI.A55094842
Copyright Eastern Economic Association Winter 2000
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, some lines of research close to mainstream economics
have started to deal with "Keynesian" or "Knightian uncertainty" (for
surveys, see Camerer and Weber [1992] and Kelsey and Quiggin [1992]). Some
of these works include positive references to Keynes' A Treatise on
Probability. At approximately the same time, in heterodox (particularly
Post Keynesian) circles, a still-growing literature has appeared on the
connection between A Treatise on Probability and Keynes' mature economic
writings, especially The General Theory and related articles. Particularly
important in this literature is the controversy around Keynes' notion of
uncertainty, as well as the possible contribution of this literature to
the interpretation of Keynes' views on liquidity preference and investment
decision making.
Also recently, scholars close to the mainstream, often applying
options theory, have emphasized the irreversibility of investment
decisions (Pindyck,1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994] and/or have linked
liquidity preference to a desire for flexibility [Makowski, 1989],
sometimes using a non-standard conception of uncertainty [Jones and
Ostroy, 1984]. This has led to a revision, within the mainstream, of
previously accepted Keynesian theories of liquidity preference and
investment.
These are interesting developments, which raise questions such as:
Has mainstream economics begun to incorporate the more heterodox ideas of
Keynes and (particularly regarding uncertainty) Knight? Are some of the
gaps between mainstream and heterodox economics being reduced?
The present paper attempts to contribute to a better understanding of
these developments and questions by clarifying some of the concepts
involved. This paper distinguishes between fundamental uncertainty and
ambiguity, two notions pertaining to situations different from what
mainstream economics deals with under the rubric of uncertainty or risk.
An important aspect of the proposed distinction is that ambiguity refers
to missing information that could be known, while fundamental uncertainty
implies that some information does not exist at the decision time because
the future is yet to be created. The distinction between fundamental
uncertainty and ambiguity is important in theoretical terms and hopefully
facilitates the communication between economists of different schools of
thought, or different lines of research, allowing the identification of
similarities and differences in their approaches to uncertainty and,
consequently, to liquidity preference and investment.
A general issue involved here is whether the future is already
predetermined, even if people cannot reliably forecast it. This issue may
at first seem too philosophical, but it may have important consequences
for policy discussions, if policy is understood as an attempt to construct
a new future. A related, more specific issue involved here is whether
uncertainty may disappear ex ante in a dynamic setting. This is important,
among other reasons, for understanding some reasons for liquidity
preference and the possible (non-) neutrality of money in the long run.
This paper argues that ambiguity, unlike fundamental uncertainty, may
disappear ex ante with the passage of time. One possible consequence of
this, which the paper cannot explore for lack of space, is that the way
would be open for new mainstream models to accommodate ambiguity while
still maintaining that money is neutral in the long run. From a Post
Keynesian perspective, these hypothetical models could then be criticized
for accepting the long-run neutrality of money, in much the same way that
Davidson [1991], for example, criticizes some analyses that, while keeping
a standard notion of uncertainty (risk), improve the mainstream treatment
of money by putting it in an intertemporal context but allow a Keynesian
type of money demand to exist only in the short run. Fundamental
uncertainty, in contrast, would be the type of uncertainty supporting the
claim, made by Keynes and his more heterodox followers, that money is not
neutral, either in the short or in the long run. In other words,
discussing the concepts of ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty may have
important applications in the debate about whether Keynes' critique of
neoclassical economics is valid only for the short run, if at all.
The distinction between ambiguity and uncertainty also contributes to
another objective of the present paper, which is to show that Keynes
referred both to ambiguity and to fundamental uncertainty (especially if
one contrasts his earlier writings with the later ones). If we understand
ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty as different types of uncertainty
and define Keynesian uncertainty as the type of uncertainty Keynes wrote
about, then the expression Keynesian uncertainty may be somewhat vague
(the same applies to Knight). It is suggested here that communication may
be improved if people adopt the distinction between fundamental
uncertainty and ambiguity, instead of using the expression Keynesian
uncertainty. While some (especially Post Keynesians) may interpret
Keynesian uncertainty as synonymous with what is called here fundamental
uncertainty, others may interpret the same expression as meaning ambiguity
- indeed, as shown below, references to Keynes have appeared in the
ambiguity literature. The discussion of Keynes' concept of uncertainty in
this paper may also help others to assess the similarities and differences
between the more mainstream and the more heterodox works which, as
mentioned above, have in common the positive references to Keynes' work on
probability and uncertainty.
In addition, the paper examines the issue of whether uncertainty
comes in degrees. It is argued here that both ambiguity and fundamental
uncertainty do admit degrees. While this is fairly clear in the case of
ambiguity, accepting that fundamental uncertainty also comes in degrees
depends on the ontological characterization of social reality and
particularly on the role of institutions. The paper argues that
fundamental uncertainty is not synonymous with complete ignorance and that
its degree varies depending on the existence and range of institutions
such as contracts, market-makers, and informal conventions.
The issue of degrees of uncertainty is important, again, for
discussions of reasons for liquidity preference. On the one hand, as
already hinted at, the impossibility of completely eliminating fundamental
uncertainty before the time of making some important economic decisions
opens the way for a permanent reason for liquidity preference, which may
not exist under ambiguity and which is strictly precautionary. On the
other hand, if, as also argued here, fundamental uncertainty can be
reduced, then both under ambiguity and under fundamental uncertainty one
of the reasons for people to prefer liquidity is that they may wait until
obtaining more information and forming more reliable estimates about the
future.1 Therefore, both the differences and the similarities between some
mainstream and some heterodox approaches to liquidity preference can be
more easily understood in the light of the conceptual discussion proposed
in this paper. The same applies to the various approaches to
irreversibility and investment decisions, which is the other side of the
liquidity preference coin.
Whether fundamental uncertainty comes in degrees or implies complete
ignorance is also an important part of the discussions regarding the
possibility of theorizing about behavior under this type of uncertainty.
Some economists neglect fundamental uncertainty, at least in part because
of a fear that it is not possible to deal with the phenomena concerned in
a rigorous manner. Related to this is the belief that anything goes in a
theory of behavior under fundamental uncertainty and the argument (by
Coddington [1982], for example) that consistently emphasizing fundamental
uncertainty leads to theoretical nihilism. Those who implicitly or
explicitly equate fundamental uncertainty with complete ignorance put more
relative emphasis on factors such as animal spirits and may have more
difficulty in debunking the charge of nihilism. Those who see fundamental
uncertainty as a matter of degree can more easily highlight the role of
institutions in an alternative economic theory. Moreover, the issue of
degrees of uncertainty is also important for determining how difficult or
easy it is to establish links between those (strands of) schools of
economic thought that emphasize fundamental uncertainty, such as Post
Keynesian, Austrian and neo-- Schumpeterian economics, on the one hand,
and those schools which stress the cognitive function of institutions,
such as old and (strands of) new institutional economics, on the other.
After all, institutions cannot perform a cognitive function under
fundamental uncertainty if the latter implies complete ignorance and
therefore does not admit degrees.
Last but not least, the issue of degrees of uncertainty may also have
important policy implications. For example, if fundamental uncertainty
implies complete ignorance, policy-makers may have no basis on which to
form expectations about the reaction of the public to their policies and
to expect some policies to be better than others.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section
distinguishes fundamental uncertainty from ambiguity. The second section
discusses the notion of Keynesian uncertainty. The third section is
concerned with whether uncertainty comes in degrees. Concluding remarks
are made in the last section.
AMBIGUITY IS NOT THE SAME AS FUNDAMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
Several decades ago, Knight and Keynes, each in his own way,
discussed uncertainty as a notion distinct from something else, which
Knight called risk. This distinction has been rejected by several
mainstream subjective probability theorists (since de Finetti and Savage),
who have then also adopted the term "uncertainty". Other scholars have
insisted on the relevance of the distinction - some of them [Lucas, 1981,
224] are mainstream economists who nevertheless neglect uncertainty
because of a belief that economic reasoning is impossible when it is
introduced.
Many authors associate uncertainty with the absence of numerical
probabilities. However, subjective probability theory, typically
represented by the Bayesian approach, claims that it is possible to assign
numerical probabilities to virtually any proposition or event. Betting
rates are the mechanism through which subjective probabilities can be
measured, allegedly also in situations that would be otherwise
characterized as ones of Knightian or Keynesian uncertainty. A person's
subjective probability regarding the truth of a proposition (ar the
occurrence of an event) is revealed by the odds at which that person is
exactly indifferent between betting for and against the proposition (or
event). For example, if a person is willing to accept to pay P* for a
gamble that pays S if proposition h is true and nothing if h is false,
then for P*/S to express the person's subjective probability it is
necessary that the person be also willing to receive P* for a gamble that
involves a loss of S if h is true and nothing if h is false [Runde,1995,
338]. This requires very precise beliefs, but presumably allows subjective
probabilities to be assigned even to unique events. Thus, if this be so,
the often-made association between uncertainty and the absence of
measurable probabilities would not make sense. The same would apply to a
distinction between risk (or weak uncertainty) and (strong) uncertainty on
these grounds.2
In the mainstream subjectivist conception, uncertainty is
characterized by the presence of a unique, additive and fully reliable
probability distribution. Defined in opposition to this, strong
uncertainty is essentially characterized by the absence of such a
distribution, due to the paucity of evidence. Although this definition of
strong uncertainty may be useful for some purposes, it is insufficient for
us to distinguish between the types of situations that have been opposed
to what mainstream economics deals with under the rubric of uncertainty or
risk. In particular, the limitation of this general definition lies in the
fact that there is a notion of uncertainty that goes beyond the standard
treatment but still falls short of stronger notions, the latter being very
relevant in economics. This less-strong type of strong uncertainty is
often called ambiguity.
Any dichotomic taxonomy - including the one that distinguishes
between weak and strong uncertainty - is insufficient to clarify the
different approaches to uncertainty in economics.
This paper is not particularly concerned with whether we should
reserve the term uncertainty for one type of situation or distinguish
between types of uncertainty, using adjectives such as strong,
fundamental, Keynesian, and so on. This question is at least in part a
strategic one, because there may be a communication problem between
economists of different schools of thought. Since the term uncertainty is
widely used in mainstream economics, it is in principle helpful to use
adjectives that suggest that one is referring to something different from
that which many mainstream economists call uncertainty.
Ambiguity
Ambiguity usually refers to a situation in which there is uncertainty
about probabilities and this uncertainty is due to lack of information. In
this case, therefore, uncertainty does not refer to a situation in which
known probabilities fall short of 1. It refers to lack of certainty about
probabilities themselves, be they 0,1, or something in between. A
situation in which a person does not know which event will happen but
unambiguously assigns a definite probability to each and every event
involves risk but not ambiguity. The same applies to the case where the
ambiguity over probability can be expressed as a second-order probability.
In this case, a person will conceive of a set of probability distributions
rather than of only one, and will be able to unambiguously assign
probabilities to each of these distributions [Camerer and Weber, 1992,
331]. Uncertainty, as it is interpreted in standard subjective probability
theory, can be measured by probability: the lower the probability, the
bigger the uncertainty. This is not so under ambiguity.
There is one particular definition of ambiguity that makes the term
suitable for distinguishing between different types of strong uncertainty.
This definition, which is adopted here, originates with Frisch and Baron
[1988] and has been more explicitly proposed by Camerer and Weber:
"Ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing
information that is relevant and could be known" [1992, 330].3
The reference to missing information that could be known is
particularly useful in applying the term 'ambiguity' to Ellsberg-type
problems, by which I mean Ellsberg's [1961] urn problems, although
Ellsberg considers other types of situations. The Ellsberg paradox is a
most important reference in the ambiguity literature.
In one of Ellsberg's problems, two urns contain balls that are
identical in every way except for their color (and perhaps not even their
color, in one of the urns). The first urn contains 100 balls, each one of
which is either red or black and the proportion of red and black balls is
unknown. The second urn contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. People
offering gambles regarding the color of a ball drawn at random from urn 1
are indifferent between betting on red and betting on black. The same
applies for urn 2. However, when asked whether they prefer to bet on a red
ball being drawn from urn 1 or from urn 2, many people prefer urn 2,
instead of showing indifference. The same preference applies if the bet is
on a black ball. If one tries to infer probabilities from these choices in
the usual way, the probabilities revealed in the choice among urns are
incompatible with the ones revealed in the choice within urns, and
contradict standard subjective expected utility (SEU) theory.
In another Ellsberg problem, one urn contains 90 balls. 30 balls are
known to be red. The remaining 60 are black and yellow, but the ratio of
black to yellow is unknown. One ball is to be drawn at random. People are
offered two pairs of bets. In the first pair, they have to choose between
"a bet on red" and "a bet on black." In the second pair, they have to
choose between "a bet on red or yellow" and "a bet on black or yellow."
Very often people choose "red" in the first pair and "black or yellow" in
the second. This implies that they prefer to bet on "red" in the first
pair while also preferring to bet on "not-red" in the second. Again, these
choices are incompatible with strict SEU theory. These decision-makers
cannot be said to be acting as if they were maximizing standard SEU.
Ellsberg [1961, 657] suggests that something else than the
desirability of the payoffs and the relative likelihood of the events is
involved, namely the nature of information about the relative likelihood,
or its ambiguity.
It should be highlighted that, in the urn problems conceived by
Ellsberg, the information about the contents of the urns in principle
exists; it is just not made available to the decision-maker. This
information is hidden, rather than nonexistent at the moment of decision.
Another important characteristic of Ellsberg-type problems is that,
even though the decision-maker does not know with full reliability the
probability that each event (or state of the world) will occur, he/she
knows all the possible events, So, even if none of the possible
probability distributions is ruled out, this situation is not really one
of "complete ignorance," despite some people's use of this expression
[Ellsberg, 1961, 657]. For example, in any of Ellsberg's urn problems, as
the number of balls of a certain color in an urn ranges from 0 to n, there
are n+1 predetermined possible states of nature defined according to the
number of balls of that color in the urn.4
A serious limitation of the notion of ambiguity is that it does not
allow one to properly deal with creativity or with structural change in
the decision-making environment, particularly a change due either to
creativity itself or to the unintended consequences of people's actions.
In Ellsberg-type problems, it is relatively straightforward to
discuss the degree of completeness of the evidence. One can conceive of
the complete information necessary to eliminate all ambiguity. For
example, in the urn problems mentioned above, information would be
complete if one knew the color of each ball in each urn. One can then
assess how far short from complete information the actual information
falls. Similarly, one can envisage what a fully reliable probability
distribution would be in this case, and this provides the standard with
which to gauge the reliability of another distribution.
Ellsberg himself may have meant to apply the term ambiguity to
situations of stronger uncertainty than that involved in his urn problems.
For example, Ellsberg states that "the results of Research and
Development, or the performance of a new President, or the tactics of an
unfamiliar opponent are all likely to appear ambiguous" [1961, 661]. He
also maintains that Üthe ambiguities surrounding the outcome of a proposed
innovation, a departure from current strategy, may be much more
noticeable' than in the case of a familiar, ongoing pattern of activity
[Ellsberg, 1961, 666]. Since Ellsberg does not elaborate on this, it is
not clear that he has in mind an uncertainty as strong as that emphasized
by economists in the Post Keynesian, Neo-- Schumpeterian and Austrian
traditions, for example, in connection with innovation and Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship (see references below). At any rate, Ellsberg's
references to innovation and the like, even if insufficiently clear, have
apparently been lost in the ambiguity literature. As far as terminology is
concerned, what matters most is the usual sense in which ambiguity has
been discussed. This seems to be well reflected in Camerer and Weber's
[1992] reference to information that could be known.
The acceptance of this more restrictive conception of ambiguity among
economists tends to be reinforced by its implicit or explicit prevalence
in the formal literature on ambiguity (sometimes called uncertainty) and
on Ellsberg [1961]. This prevalence can be seen in the case of two of the
major formal approaches that generalize expected utility (EU) theory
beyond weak uncertainty: the multiple-priors approach and the non-additive
prior approach. (For a detailed discussion of these and other alternatives
to standard EU and particularly SEU theory, see Kelsey and Quiggin [1992]
and Camerer and Weber [1992].)
The multiple-priors approach abandons the standard idea that
decision-makers have a unique probability distribution. Ellsberg [1961,
661] himself introduces a set of probability distributions and also refers
to the confidence that the decision-maker has in his/her estimates. Thus,
the idea of full reliability is also abandoned, which explains the
paradox, since in Ellsberg's experiments people prefer more reliable
information. A similar approach, in an otherwise Bayesian framework, is
pursued by Gardenfors and Sahlin [1982]. An axiomatization of the multiple
prior approach is provided by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989].
Within this approach, Bewley [1989] deserves a special mention for
dealing not only with the Ellsberg paradox but also with innovation and
entrepreneurship. In this sense, he goes beyond the ambiguity literature
and recovers Ellsberg's references to innovation. Bewley drops the
assumption of complete preferences but keeps the assumption of an
exhaustive list of states. Thus, his view of innovations is quite limited.
Innovations are treated as new alternatives that change the available
choice set but do not create new states. States are thus still conceived
of as independent of what people do. People form multiple subjective
probability distributions and there is a "true distribution" or a "true
stochastic mechanism governing the environment" [Bewley, 1989, 4-5].
The non-additive prior approach, again axiomatically developed by
Schmeidler [1989] and Gilboa [1987], retains the commitment to point
probabilities (and for this is criticized by Runde [1995, 349n]), but
replaces the Bayesian prior with a nonadditive measure or capacity. This
results from the introduction of weaker axioms than Savage's sure thing
principle and allows for an explanation of the Ellsberg paradox.5 A
nonadditive measure may exhibit uncertainty (ambiguity) aversion
[Schmeidler, 1989, 574]. The degree of subadditivity may be taken to
represent one's faith in probability assessments (Karni and Schmeidler,
1991, 1803; Camerer and Weber, 1992, 348].
In terms of standard subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, as
represented by Savage [1954], situations of ambiguity may violate not only
the sure thing principle but also the complete ordering axiom. This axiom
requires people to have a complete preference ordering over acts (the
relation among events is to be inferred from people's choices). People
choose between acts the consequences of which depend on which state of the
world prevails.6 Their propensity to act (to bet on the occurrence of some
events, as seen above) is the instrument through which subjective
probabilities can be estimated. Under ambiguity, people may refuse bets
that would allow the elicitation of their subjective probabilities,
because they prefer to wait for the missing information and/or because of
fear of asymmetric information, that is, fear that someone else may have
the missing information [Frisch and Baron,1988; Camerer and Weber, 1992].
Fundamental Uncertainty
Going beyond situations of ambiguity, members of different schools of
heterodox economic thought have emphasized situations of uncertainty of a
more radical type. These situations are essentially characterized by the
possibility of creativity and structural change and therefore by
significant indeterminacy of the future. Uncertainty appears here in a
dynamic context, in which the passage of time is crucial. The future
cannot be anticipated by a fully reliable probabilistic estimate because
the future is yet to be created. In socioeconomic contexts, the future is
to a considerable extent unknowable, because surprises may occur, both as
intended and as unintended consequences of human action. The very
decisions that would require a fully reliable probabilistic guide may
change the socioeconomic future in an unpredictable way, and this
possibility of change prevents such a fully reliable guide from existing.
The problem is not merely that we do not have enough information to
reliably attach probabilities to a given number of events. An event which
we cannot yet imagine may occur in the future. As we cannot imagine it in
the present, we cannot attribute to it any probability. This means that
some relevant information cannot be known, not even in principle, at the
time of making many important decisions. Associated with this is the fact
that in many cases, as something that we cannot imagine may happen, we
cannot conceive what the complete information would be.
This argument has clear antecedents in the work of Shackle [1972,
399-400], who is against the use of probability distributions, even
subjective ones, in situations of fundamental uncertainty. A similar point
has been more recently raised against both the rational expectations
hypothesis and SEU theory by Bausor [1983, 6-7; 1985, 69-- 73], Davidson
(1991,132,136], Carvalho [1988, 75] and Vickers [1994], among others. It
is not denied here that decision-makers may still construct subjective
probability distributions in these situations, if they so wish, but they
should acknowledge the unknowability of a list of all possible events and
the consequent limited guidance provided by these probability
distributions.7
The best example of human creativity and of unpredictable structural
change in the economic sphere is the introduction of technological or
managerial innovations, as in Schumpeter's process of creative
destruction. This is a good example to show that what is at issue here is
not whether a machine will be invented that can make more precise
predictions about the future.8 People can be creative in the sense of
doing things that cannot be thought of in advance. No machine could have
determined in advance if someone would invent the airplane, the
television, or the computer, just to use examples of this century. These
examples are quite adequate to illustrate the argument that we can at
least say that one particular machine will not be invented, namely a
machine that reliably predicts the whole future of the social world.
Schumpeterian creative destruction plays an important role in the
defense of a more radical notion of uncertainty by Post Keynesians such as
Davidson [1991], Dow and Dow [1985, 55], and Lavoie [1992, 44]. The
connection between innovations and a more radical type of uncertainty also
appears in the Neo-Schumpeterian literature (for example, Freeman [1982,
149-50] and especially Dosi and Egidi [1991, 148]), as well as in some
strands of Austrian and new institutional economics [Langlois,1994].9
Innovations are particularly important in this context because
competition, in a capitalist system, stimulates decision-makers to
innovate in search of extra profits, so that there is an endogenous
pressure for something that causes uncertainty - see Kregel [1990, 90] on
Shackle.
In all these schools or strands, a stronger type of uncertainty than
ambiguity is connected with the possibility of unpredictable structural
changes in general, and not only due to innovations [Lawson, 1985, 921;
Hamouda and Smithin, 1988, 162-63; Davidson,1991, 133; Dosi and
Egidi,1991,148; Langlois,1994,121]. Historical changes can be of a more
typically political or cultural nature. They have a significant impact on
preferences, work relations, the workers' bargaining power, government
decisions, etc.
We must question the very applicability of the notion of state of the
world. In EU theory, a state of the world is defined as independent of
acts. This means that, whatever the intended or unintended consequences of
what people do, people's acts cannot create new "states of the world."
This does not prevent one from using the notion of state of the world to
deal with Ellsberg-type problems, for in these cases the list of all
possible states of the worlds is already predetermined. In other,
fundamental cases of uncertainty, the notion of state of the world as it
is usually constructed cannot be used.
This means that criticisms of EU theory in its own field are
inevitably limited. For example, Camerer and Weber argue that "preferring
bets on unambiguous events is only a violation of SEU if equivalence
between the likelihoods of the ambiguous and unambiguous events has been
established"[1992, 339]. This is possible in Ellsberg-- type problems, but
SEU theory is not even applicable in more radical problems, because of
limitations in its very conceptual apparatus, particularly regarding the
notion of state of the world. A less restrictive notion of event, as
something that can be endogenous to the decision process, is needed to
allow for creativity. Technical change, for example, implies endogeneity
of events (Dosi and Egidi, 1991, 148].
Ambiguity in a Dynamic Setting and Fundamental Uncertainty
It is conceivable, under ambiguity in a dynamic setting, that more
information may become available to the decision-makers, changing their
probability distributions and/or their assessment of the reliability of
these distributions. If so, people may wish to wait until they obtain more
information and thus temporarily refuse to bet under ambiguity, not
revealing any subjective probabilities. In contrast, regardless of whether
fundamental uncertainty implies complete ignorance or not, it does imply
that some types of information will never be obtained ex ante, no matter
how long people wait. When creativity and unpredictable structural change
are possible some information is not knowable at the moment of decision.
If, as argued below, fundamental uncertainty does not imply complete
ignorance, the ordinal degree of uncertainty regarding the results of a
decision may vary over time. In this case, people may also wait to obtain
more information; for example, they may wait until some phase of
institutional turmoil is over. However, they should not wait for
information that will never exist at the time of decision. Moreover, since
some information does not exist at the time of decision, such information
is not asymmetric: nobody has it (of course, asymmetry is possible
regarding the information that does exist). Thus, a refusal to bet may
also happen under fundamental uncertainty, but the reasons for this
refusal need not be the same that operate in a context of ambiguity,
namely, a wait for additional information or fear of asymmetric
information. If the decision-maker acknowledges the existence of
fundamental uncertainty, he/she may prefer not to bet on the occurrence of
any of the "states of the world" that he/she is able to imagine. The
decision-maker may also wish to protect himself/herself against the
occurrence of undesirable unpredictable events.10
The common definition of uncertainty as a situation in which
objective probabilities are not known is not sufficiently clear. It may
describe ambiguity, where the objective probabilities exist, but also
fundamental uncertainty, where they do not. In the case of ambiguity, the
passage of time may lead people's subjective probability distribution to
converge towards an objective, fully reliable probability distribution
that can be said to exist.11 In the case of fundamental uncertainty, such
an objective distribution does not exist at the time of decision and
therefore nothing can converge to it. It should also be noted that, for a
ribution does not exist, in any
situation.
KEYNESIAN UNCERTAINTY
Keynes, Ambiguity and Fundamental Uncertainty
Keynes' name has often been mentioned in discussions of uncertainty,
particularly when uncertainty is distinguished from risk. Sometimes people
write of Keynesian uncertainty or of uncertainty in Keynes' sense.
However, it is necessary to clarify which type of uncertainty one is
writing about, because different conceptions of uncertainty exist whose
proponents may claim a Keynesian lineage. Keynes in his several writings
refers both to situations of ambiguity and of fundamental uncertainty,
without explicitly distinguishing between them. Thus, the expression
"Keynesian uncertainty," if interpreted as meaning the type of uncertainty
Keynes wrote about, may be sufficient to indicate that one is not
referring to risk in an objectivist approach or to uncertainty in standard
SEU theory. However it leaves unanswered the question of whether one is
referring to ambiguity or to fundamental uncertainty.
Situations of ambiguity appear in hisA Treatise on Probability (the
Treatise hereafter). Indeed, Keynes [1973a,82] discussed in the Treatise a
case very similar to one of Ellsberg's [1961] urn problems. It is
particularly in his later economic writings that Keynes refers to
situations of fundamental uncertainty. Keynes [1937, 113-14] includes "the
obsolescence of a new invention,""the prospect of an European war," and
"the position of private wealth owners in the social system" thirty years
hence as examples of uncertain matters about which "we simply do not
know." See also Keynes [1936, 141, 252] and his comments on Tinbergen
[Keynes, 1973b, 287, 309].
These situations are not the focus of attention in A Treatise on
Probability, but Keynes refers to the Treatise in The General Theory and
related writings (see some references below). A whole line of research has
emerged that interprets Keynes' mature economic writings in the light of
his earlier work on probability.
Controversy Surrounding A Treatise on Probability
Attempts to express Keynes' notion of uncertainty in terms of the
Treatise have been the subject of much controversy. Some interpreters have
argued that uncertainty corresponds to an absence of numerically
determinate or even comparable probabilities [Lawson, 1988; Rotheim,1988,
88; Brown-Collier and Bausor,1988, 238-39; Hamouda and Smithin, 1988, 160;
and Dutt and Amadeo, 1990, 105-6]. However, there are also those for whom
probability relates to just one dimension of Keynes' notion of
uncertainty, with another dimension relating to the Treatise's notion of
weight. In its second dimension, uncertainty is measured by weight
[Hoogduin,1987; Kregel,1987; O'Donnell,1991; Runde, 1991; Anand,1991;
Brady, 1993; and Gerrard, 1995]. While probability in the Treatise is a
relation between two propositions, weight has to do with the evidence on
which the probability relation is based. Keynes is not always consistent
in defining weight, and two basic concepts may be extracted from the
Treatise [Keynes, 1973a, 77, 84, 345]. According to the first definition,
weight represents the amount of relevant evidence. According to the second
definition, weight represents the evidence's degree of completeness (which
is equivalent to the balance of relevant knowledge and relevant
ignorance). The second concept is less accepted among Keynes' interpreters
but is the one required to connect weight with the notion of confidence in
The General Theory [Runde, 1990].
Weak uncertainty (risk) would refer, in the Treatise terms, to the
presence of numerical less-than-unity probabilities and maximum weight.
The Treatise interpreters mentioned above are clearly discussing something
else, but they have overlooked the difference between ambiguity and
fundamental uncertainty.
Expressed in the Treatise terms, both ambiguity and fundamental
uncertainty are cases in which there is no basis for establishing point,
numerical probabilities. In the case of ambiguity, one may use interval
probabilities. People may be uncertain about point probabilities or about
interval probabilities, but the list of possible events is already
predetermined, contrary to what happens under fundamental uncertainty.
Moreover, in most ambiguity models, doubts about the list of possible
events are not considered (one exception is Mukerji [1997)). Both
ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty are marked by a paucity of evidence
and, thus, in the Treatise terms, by low weight. Weight is not synonymous
with ambiguity, nor fundamental uncertainty. Rather, it has been proposed
as a measure of ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. Both ambiguity and
fundamental uncertainty represent the lack of knowledge, or lack of
reliability of knowledge, resulting from the lack of evidence, and weight
measures the amount or completeness of evidence. However, that does not
mean that the notion of weight is equally applicable to both cases. This
is the issue to which I now turn.
Weight: A Difficulty
The concept of weight, in general and not only in Keynes' work, still
awaits proper clarification [Hamouda and Rowley, 1996, 121] and involves
rather complicated issues [Cohen, 1985]. In the ambiguity literature, the
connection between this notion and ambiguity has been noted by Gardenfors
and Sahlin [1982], Frisch and Baron (1988], Camerer and Weber [1992],
Kelsey [1994] and Fox and Tversky [1995]. In most cases, people interpret
weight as the amount of evidence, but, as argued above, it is relatively
straightforward to discuss the evidence's degree of completeness in
Ellsberg-type problems. This degree of completeness is one of the senses
in which Keynes defines weight. Here, therefore, Keynes' notion of weight
in this latter sense can also be used in a relatively straightforward way.
Regarding fundamental uncertainty, the notion of weight is more
problematic. For those who think that fundamental uncertainty implies
complete ignorance and does not come in degrees, weight as a measure of
uncertainty would have no place in this context. If, in contrast,
fundamental uncertainty is not seen as implying complete ignorance, this
does not mean that all the necessary conditions for using weight would be
satisfied, for one difficulty still remains in this case. Situations of
fundamental uncertainty are such that we cannot precisely establish how
complete our information about the future is. This is due to the fact the
future is yet to be created by our very actions. No predetermined full
amount of information exists to provide a standard to which the
completeness of actual information can be compared. Keynes, in The General
Theory [Keynes, 1936, 148n, 240n] and in a 1938 letter to Townshend
(Keynes, 1979, 293], seems to have suggested we use the notion of weight
when dealing with fundamental uncertainty. If we are to do so, and in
particular if we are to use weight in the sense of the evidence's degree
of completeness (so that we can relate weight to confidence), we cannot
imply that complete information exists at the time of decision under
fundamental uncertainty.
The difficulty in applying weight to these situations has been
neglected by those who suggest that we use weight as a measure of
uncertainty, with the possible exception of Runde, who admits that "we can
never say how complete our information is at any point"[1990, 283]. This
difficulty implies either that Keynes' notion of weight cannot be used in
situations of fundamental uncertainty or that is has to be used in a
different way.12
Does Uncertainty Come in Degrees?
Can we speak of degrees of uncertainty, at least in ordinal even if
not in cardinal terms? It is important, again, to distinguish between
ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty.
It is relatively easy to defend the idea that ambiguity comes in
degrees. In the first section, some possible measures of ambiguity were
mentioned. One of them is weight, in Keynes' Treatise framework.13 In the
generalizations of EU theory, measures of ambiguity are clearly admitted,
such as the degree of subadditivity of a single probability distribution,
in the non-additive prior approach, or Gardenfors and Sahlin's [1982]
degree of epistemic reliability of multiple probability distributions, in
the multiple prior approach.
Whether fundamental uncertainty comes in degrees depends, first of
all, on whether or not fundamental uncertainty implies complete ignorance.
If it does, as on some occasions Shackle [1967, 228] and Vickers [1994,12]
seem to argue, it cannot be a matter of degrees.
The characterization of fundamental uncertainty by the possibility of
creativity and structural change is basically an ontological one. This
ontological criterion has been adopted by Davidson [1996] to distinguish
uncertainty from other situations, based on the difference between what he
calls a transmutable and an immutable reality. The ontological side of the
discussion about uncertainty inevitably has a counterpart in terms of the
type of knowledge that people can or cannot have under fundamental
uncertainty. It is necessary to examine in more depth both the ontological
conception of economic reality and its counterpart in terms of knowledge.
The counterpart, in terms of knowledge, of the ontological conception
of economic reality as subject to unpredictable structural changes is
fundamental uncertainty. But does this uncertainty imply complete absence
of knowledge, that is, complete ignorance (or unknowledge, to use
Shackle's expression)? First of all, people are, or at least may be, aware
of uncertainty itself. In Hicks' [1977, vii] aphorism, people [may] know
they don't know. Can people know more than that? As the type of knowledge
of reality that is possible for us to have depends on the characteristics
of reality, the question then becomes: is there an ontological basis for
some knowledge in a transmutable reality? That depends on whether there is
more to be said of the ontology of such a changeable reality.
This is the question examined next. Having elaborated on ontology,
the paper then turns to the issue of whether fundamental uncertainty comes
in degrees.
Social Practices and Knowledge under Fundamental Uncertainty
There is more to be said of ontology, particularly regarding the
existence of social practices that lend stability to economic reality. For
the purposes of this paper, perhaps the least controversial of these
practices are those related to the existence of some legal institutions,
so let us begin with them. Later on, reference is made to other, more
informal social practices.
Legal Institutions: Contracts. Legal contracts reduce uncertainty
about the future values of nominal variables. This is particularly so in
the case of costs such as wages and inputs. Contracts do not, in general,
make real outcomes more knowable, but some contracts are linked to a price
index. In any case, nominal outcomes are of great importance in a monetary
economy.
Ontologically, the existence of legal contracts has to be associated
with the existence of another institution, the State, which is supposed to
enforce contracts. In terms of knowledge, the existence of the state and
its power to enforce contracts, resorting to physical force if necessary,
creates an ontological basis for the belief that contracts will be
enforced in case one of the parties decides not to fulfill its obligations
or finds itself unable to do so, due to unforeseen circumstances. (It is
these two possibilities that lead some creditors to require a collateral
before engaging in debt contracts). Consequently, there is an ontological
basis for a decision-maker's belief in his/her estimates of future values
of nominal variables specified in contracts. The existence of contracts
and the State rules out at least some events or outcomes that would be
possible or more likely otherwise.14
It should be noted, however, that the role of contracts varies
according to how people understand them and to how the state enforces
them. This varies from country to country and from time to time, and
depends on informal social practices (which are commented on below).
Legal Institutions: Market-Makers. Another type of institution that
provides stability to a transmutable reality is a market-maker. In a
market for a durable asset, the market-maker is responsible for providing
orderliness, significantly reducing the magnitude of possible changes in
the asset spot price. Prices are more stable, even if not rigid, than they
would be in the absence of a market-maker.
A very important market-maker is the central bank in its role of
lender of last resort [Minsky, 1986; Davidson, 1988]. In this role, the
central bank provides a more concrete basis for people's expectations not
only about prices, but also other nominal variables, such as deposits in
bank accounts and shares of bank funds. Bank insolvency would be a much
more serious threat without commercial banks having the central bank to
fall back on. The same applies to generalized bankruptcy, which would
affect the value of all sorts of economic variables. In addition, the
central bank is important in the control of international transactions. At
an international level, institutional arrangements may exist that work in
a similar way that an international central bank would, to reduce the
volatility of exchange rates and international reserves.
More generally, public institutions like the central bank and others,
through their influence on prices and on the level of economic activity,
contribute to reduce fundamental uncertainty, if they act to promote
stability both in terms of prices and growth. Public announcements of
their long-term policies may play an important part in this.
Informal Institutions. One can also speak of the stabilizing role of
institutions, including conventions, in the sense of socially shared
and/or prescribed standards of thought and behavior. Although people can
be creative and idiosyncratic, we do not expect (all of) them to behave in
a completely erratic manner, because people have been socialized.
In the institutionalist literature, the historical and therefore
changeable character of the social reality has been emphasized, but, at
the same time, both old and new institutionalists argue that institutions
perform an important cognitive function. This cognitive function refers,
firstly, to the information that institutions provide to the individual,
including the indication of the likely action of other people. I call this
the informational-cognitive function of institutions. Secondly, the
cognitive function of institutions also includes their influence on the
very perception that people have of reality, that is, on the way people
select, organize and interpret information. I call this their deeper
cognitive function.
Much of our knowledge of these informal social practices is tacit or
practical, that is, held subconsciously. This kind of knowledge tends to
be neglected in discussions of uncertainty, but it is possible to think of
practical knowledge as providing a basis for beliefs regarding events.
Through their cognitive function, institutions provide and influence
knowledge in an environment marked by fundamental uncertainty. At the same
time, this cognitive function may prevent people with different
institutional backgrounds from understanding each other. These people may
attribute different meanings not only to informal institutions, but also
to formal ones, like contracts. The mere presence of these informal and
formal institutions is not sufficient, therefore, to reduce uncertainty in
social interactions.
Does Fundamental Uncertainty Come in Degrees?
People do have some kind of knowledge even in a transmutable reality,
that is, even in situations of fundamental uncertainty. This opens the way
for us to speak of different degrees of fundamental uncertainty. I have in
mind ordinal rather than cardinal degrees: we can speak of some situations
involving less uncertainty than others (in contrast, we could not say this
if fundamental uncertainty implied complete ignorance). For example, in
social environments where the institution of contracts is more widespread
than in others and where more market-makers exist, there is less
uncertainty about the possible future nominal values of important
variables and there are fewer nominal variables about whose future values
people do not know anything. There are fewer outcomes and events that can
be considered as possible or likely. Inversely, uncertainty increases when
institutional arrangements that have promoted stability break down.
Admittedly, we cannot know exactly how ignorant we are, as the future
is yet to be created. No standard of complete knowledge or complete
ignorance exists to provide a reference against which to measure our
actual ignorance. However, we can say that people are more ignorant at
least about some things - such as possible future values of nominal
variables - in some situations than in others. The difference between
these situations depend on the existence and prevalence of stabilizing
institutional practices. It is in this specific sense that we can say that
the degree of uncertainty is bigger in some cases than in others.
Our knowledge of the stabilizing effect of these social practices
provides us with a concrete basis on which to assess the degree of
uncertainty. The assessment can never be completely objective in
situations of fundamental uncertainty, given that complete information
does not exist ex ante; however, the basis provided by these social
practices means that the assessment of uncertainty is not completely a
question of animal spirits or the like.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fundamental uncertainty has to be distinguished from uncertainty as
defined in mainstream economics and from ambiguity. As emphasized by
members of different schools of heterodox economic thought, fundamental
uncertainty reflects the limitations of knowledge in an environment marked
by the possibility of creativity and structural change. Ambiguity has been
accommodated in some generalizations of expected utility theory, but not
fundamental uncertainty.
Keynesian uncertainty, interpreted as the type of uncertainty Keynes
wrote about, includes both ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. Keynes'
later economic writings convey a notion of fundamental uncertainty,
sometimes with references to his earlier book on probability. However, not
everyone usingA Treatise on Probability to conceptualize uncertainty has
fundamental uncertainty in mind, for that book can also be used in
connection with ambiguity.
The distinction between ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty is also
useful when discussing if one can speak of (at least ordinal) degrees of
uncertainty. It is relatively easier - or less difficult - to argue that
ambiguity comes in degrees. Finding some standard with which to gauge the
available evidence's degree of completeness or reliability is relatively
less complicated in this case, although difficulties exist when it is
necessary, for example, to assess the quality of the available evidence in
different situations.
At least one major complicating factor must be added when examining
if fundamental uncertainty comes in degrees: some information simply does
not exist at the time of making decisions, because the future is yet to be
created. No predetermined full amount of information exists to provide a
standard to which the completeness of actual information can be compared.
However, in some cases it is possible to maintain that decision-makers are
at least more ignorant about some relevant issues than in other cases. In
order to accept this, one has to go beyond the ontological
characterization of economic reality as subject to creativity and
unpredictable structural change. The expanded ontological characterization
suggested here is one that includes stabilizing social practices, which
provide a basis for some kind of knowledge together with fundamental
uncertainty.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank Paul Davidson, Sheila Dow, Geoff Harcourt
and Jochen Runde, as well as the editor of this Journal and two anonymous
referees for useful comments and discussions. The usual caveats apply.
Financial support from FAPESP (Sao Paulo, Brazil) is also gratefully
acknowledged.
1. Thus, this paper provides the basis for an alternative approach
(developed in Dequech, 2000) both to that which emphasizes the association
between liquidity preference and waiting [Jones and Ostroy, 1984;
Makowski, 19891 and that which rejects the waiting argument and emphasizes
the long-run non-neutrality of money [Davidson, 1991]. In this alternative
approach, waiting is possible, but money is not neutral in the long run
(nor in the short run).
2. Note that mainstream subjectivist theorists may accept another
distinction between risk and uncertainty, based on the existence or not of
objective probabilities known to the decision-maker [ Harsanyi, 1977, 9],
while still claiming that they can deal with uncertainty.
3. Camerer and Weber are more explicit than Frisch and Baron [1988]
about the fact that the missing information could be known.
4. It is in relation to Ellsberg's urn problems that Einhorn and
Hogarth [1986] define ambiguity. In the case of an urn with an unknown
proportion of balls of different colors, several probability distributions
over the proportion of the different types of balls are admissible and
equally likely. For Einhorn and Hogarth "ambiguity results from the
uncertainty associated with specifying which of a set of distributions is
appropriate in a given situation. Moreover, the amount of ambiguity is an
increasing function of the number of distributions that are not ruled out
by one's knowledge of the situation" [1986, S229]. At one extreme, no
distribution is ruled out. This corresponds to what Einhorn and Hogarth
call ignorance. If people were gradually given information about the
contents of the urn, ambiguity would decrease until all distributions were
ruled out but one, which constitutes a situation of risk (Ellsberg (1961,
657-58] must be their source of inspiration). New types of probability
distributions, defined over new states of the world, cannot be added to
the set of probability distributions to which Einhorn and Hogarth refer.
5. This principle is the analogue in Savage's theory to the
independence axiom in Von Neumann-- Morgenstern's (actually, in a theory
named after Von Neumann and Morgenstern, who did not state the
independence axiom explicitly). It can be stated as follows: if the
lottery L* is preferred to the lottery L, then the mixture aL* + (1- a)L**
will be preferred to the mixture aL + (1-a)L** for all a>0 and L**
[Machina, 1987, 127]. Mixing each of two lotteries with a third one-in the
same proportion in the two cases -does not change the ranking. Ellsberg
examples show that the comparison between these alternatives depends also
on the reliability of the available information. The preferences revealed
in Ellsberg's experiments are inconsistent with the existence of additive
probabilities, and in Savage's theory the sure thing principle is mainly
responsible for the additivity of probabilities [Karni and Schmeidler,
1991, 1803].
6. In alternative presentations of the standard theory, probabilities
are directly attached to consequences, which is equivalent to attaching
them to states because there is a one-to-one correspondence from states to
consequences.
7. Langlois and Cosgel interpret Knight as saying that a
decision-maker facing uncertainty "would have first to Üestimate' the
possible outcomes to be able to Üestimate' the probabilities of occurrence
of each" [1993, 460]. Also worth mentioning here is Carvalho's [1988, 76]
interpretation of Keynes' logical probability theory. He argues that: in
situations of uncertainty people have to use their imagination to create
the premises on which they reason; Ügiven these premises, a probable
relation can be built'; and, in order to act, people have to have
confidence in the premises.
8. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for forcing me to clarify
this point.
9. In Austrian and new institutional economics, the discussion of
cognitive problems sometimes centers on the complexity of the world
vis--vis people's limited capability. Going beyond this, Langlois
maintains that "one does not in fact know with certainty a listing of all
possible states of the world. This uncertainty about the very structure of
the world, not captured in neoclassical modeling and not well-suited to
the probability calculus, is what I have called structural uncertainty"
[1994, 119-20] . He also connects this uncertainty with innovative
behavior: "Perhaps the clearest example of the characteristic Austrian
focus on structural uncertainty ... is to be seen in the theory of
entrepreneurship" [ibid., 121]. However, the Austrian emphasis on
entrepreneurship is not sufficient in this context, since entrepreneurship
is sometimes associated with the discovery of already existing
opportunities rather than with the creation of new ones. Wubben [1995]
provides a comprehensive survey of the Austrian treatment of uncertainty,
with some references to fundamental types of uncertainty.
10. Davidson (1991, 134] observes that Keynes' liquidity preference
is associated with a violation of the complete ordering axiom. Davidson
adopts a notion of fundamental uncertainty, but, as noted above, this
violation may also occur under ambiguity. The lack of an exhaustive list
of states may be sufficient but is not necessary for incompleteness of
preferences.
11. This possibility of convergence could also be envisaged by those
who attribute the decision-makers' lack of knowledge to their limited
mental capabilities. Convergence could occur as this capability increases
and as people have more time to understand a complex but constant
environment.
12. It should be noted that the expression "Knightian uncertainty"
has also been associated with both ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty.
Ellsberg (1961, 653] observed that Knight (1921) had discussed something
similar to one of his urn problems. On the association between Knight and
fundamental uncertainty, see, for example, Langlois and Cosgel [1993].
Like Keynes', Knight's notion of uncertainty has been the subject of much
controversy.
13. There is no implication here that weight could be measured
non-arbitrarily in situations of ambiguity. For a suggestion that the
measurement of weight is somewhat arbitrary in this case, see Cohen [1985,
274-75]. See also Georgescu-Roegen [1958, 24-25] on the difficulty of
measuring what he calls the "credibility" of a probability (or betting
quotient). Credibility is very similar to ambiguity, according to Ellsberg
[1961, 659]. The quality and not only the quantity of the information may
be important [Kelsey, 1994, 435], which complicates measurement.
14. Under fundamental uncertainty, as unimaginable events may occur,
contracts are necessarily incomplete. This is not so under ambiguity, but
see Mukerji [1998] for the argument that ambiguity aversion justifies the
existence of incomplete contracts.
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David Dequech
University of Campinas
David Dequech: Institute of Economics, University of Campinas,
Campinas, Sao Paulo, 13083-330, Brazil. E-mail: Dequech@eco.unicamp.br